Left studying nuke text

JYOTI MALHOTRA

New Delhi, August 3, 2007 : The sound and fury over selling out to the US on the negotiation of the so-called 123 nuclear agreement seemed to have collapsed in a whimper, on the day the much-awaited draft was simultaneously released in Delhi and Washington.

The Left parties said they were still studying the text carefully, while the BJP was meeting this evening at the house of former PM Atal Behari Vajpayee to formulate considered strategy in Parliament a week from now. Initial BJP reactions said their ``reservations remained.’’

But the fact that neither political grouping, which had virtually put the Manmohan Singh government on notice as it publicly opposed every step in the tortuous negotiation, had any significant criticism today, indicated they were unable to find a worthy `brahmastra’ with which to retaliate.

Meanwhile, the 22-page text, put on the website of the Ministry of External Affairs this morning without as much as an SMS warning, pointed towards the government’s complete self- confidence over the deal.

According to the text, the agreement will remain in force for 40 years, that is till 2048 AD, and for 10-year periods thereafter.

Although the formal signing still remains, the availability of the text brings the curtains down on a dramatic two-year-long negotiation, during which the MEA and even the prime minister’s office often seemed at war with Anil Kakodkar’s Department of Atomic Energy over the content of the discussions with the US.

The final product has incorporated most Indian demands, including the right to reprocess spent fuel, uninterrupted supply of fuel for India’s 14 safeguarded civilian reactors (and many more India hopes will be built) as well as a strategic fuel reserve.

Most importantly, this deal is only about the ``civilian’’ nuclear relationship between the two countries. The agreement completely omits any reference to India’s military programme, thereby allowing India to carry on producing fissile material and making bombs from the 8 nuclear reactors that are not open to international inspection.

Possibly the only major compromise on India’s part is that the text doesn’t name India as a nuclear weapons state, instead preferring the much-milder ``cooperation between two parties possessing advanced nuclear technology.’’

But here’s another surprise. There is absolutely no mention of the word ``test’’ that India may want to carry out in the hypothetical future. However, there is considerable, very delicately-worded language on the consequences of ``cessation of cooperation.’’

Meaning, the US has conceded that India retains the right to carry out a nuclear test if it so wishes to do so.

Analysts pointed out that India had not seen any reason to test even once after the 1998 tests at Pokharan. However, the Left-BJP groupings had insisted that India not relinquish the right of a ``voluntary’’ moratorium.

In fact, briefing the BJP delegation last week, External Affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee said if India indeed wanted to test, all it had to do was to give notice one year before and ``walk out of the agreement.’’

However, if India does test and all cooperation ceases on the part of the US, that is the US invokes the ``right to return’’ clause that is a key aspect of its domestic law, and disruption of fuel supplies occur, the US has promised to convene, along with India, ``a group of friendly supplier countries (including) Russia, France and the UK to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supplies to India.’’

Notably, China is absent from the list of ``friendly countries’’ the US will call upon to ensure uninterrupted fuel supplies for India’s civilian nuclear programme.

Interestingly, the text almost warns against the invocation of the ``right to return’’ clause, saying it will have ``profound implications’’ for the relationship. It goes on to point to the ``negative consequences’’ of termination on ongoing contracts and projects between the two countries.

Still, ``consent to reprocess’’ is in conjunction with India’s decision to establish a national reprocessing facility that will be additionally safeguarded by the IAEA.

It was this offer of double safeguards – the fuel for the nuclear reactors is safeguarded in the first place, and reprocessing it will attract the second set of safeguards -- surprisingly by none other than the DAE on the eve of the Heilingendamm meeting, that cracked the nuclear impasse between the two sides.

ENDS