No middle path on nuke deal

JYOTI MALHOTRA

New Delhi, August 17 , 2007: It’s the season of ironies, both in India and the US, as both nations on either side of the Atlantic await with bated breath the outcome of the Left parties’ meetings on the kind of relationship India should adopt with the ``imperialist’’ US.

One thing is, however, certain. The Indo-US nuclear deal has already acquired such a momentum of its own, that if the government acquiesces to Left pressure to stop ``operationalising’’ the deal, it may end up virtually killing it.

That is because US President George Bush’s rapidly waning popularity means that his administration will practically become lame-duck after the US Congress returns from its December recess.

Under the circumstances, the US Congress must pass the deal in a ``yes-no’’ (up-down) vote by early-mid December. Analysts say that this is the last of three steps that will make the deal fully operational.

The other two steps are related to talks between Delhi (the department of atomic energy and the MEA) and the IAEA on negotiating an India-specific safeguards agreement. Simultaneously, Delhi’s envoys have already begun talking to 45 countries who are members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for an Indian waiver.

PM’s special envoy Shyam Saran has been on the road for the past week, visiting Russia and Germany, after which he goes to Brazil and Argentina.

If the Left refuses to soften its stand on ``operationalising’’ the deal, and if the government ends up accepting the Left’s demands for the sake of saving itself, the easiest way out would be to opt for a go-slow approach.

The danger of that, however, is that if the US Congress doesn’t pass the deal by early-mid December, it is as good as dead. There can be no middle path on this one.

Significantly, even as the Left debates the crisis within itself, it may be surprised to find its views are near identical to several non-proliferation hawks within the US establishment, which believes the Bush administration has virtually destroyed the architecture of non-proliferation by making an exception for India.

Top non-proliferation hawk Michael Krepon of the Stimson Centre in Washington DC said : ``At the very least, the Bush administration should not make it easier for New Delhi to resume nuclear testing and to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. It appears that the 123 Agreement fails to meet these minimal standards as well as the clear requirements established in the Hyde Act.”

Nuclear expert Robert Einhorn added : “Mr Bush, eager to place relations with India on a new footing, waived many of the restrictions in order to sign the initial deal... Now we’ve gone beyond that, and given India something that we don’t give to Russia and China.’’

Back home, former ambassador to Bangladesh Deb Mukherjee said the perception that India was not averse to becoming a junior partner of the US was growing. By inviting the USS Nimitz to anchor in Indian waters and by voting against Iran at the IAEA, he said such a perception was also growing in the region.

He said he had been asked by people in Bangladesh whether India was becoming the US ``chowkidar’’ in the region.


ENDS